


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REMARKS					
<p>1. The overall tenor of this talk is very good. It addresses a complex problem clearly.</p> <p>2. Recommended corrections have been penciled in.</p> <p>3. We do not hold casualty figures regarding civilians during 1960 as addressed.</p> <p>4. A change in wording in the statement concerning ARVN discovery of arms caches as it pertains to VC morale is suggested.</p>					
FROM		 W. J. HABERER, JR. Colonel, USA Chief, Eastern Division		DATE 4/20 <hr/> PHONE 71564	

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CYRUS R. VANCE, AT AMERICAN ORDNANCE ASSN.

4/16/65
1st DRAFT

ST. LOUIS, MO.

APRIL 27, 1965

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Three conclusions follow: First, it is essential that the manpower balance within South Vietnam be shifted in favor of the government forces. Second, it is essential that the critical flow of personnel, support and direction from North Vietnam be reduced. And third, is a point of principle -- that the enemy cannot be permitted to continue to have the unfair advantage implicit in his concealed aggression.

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We have taken a number of steps to redress the manpower imbalance. An increase of 160,000 South Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces and police is underway. In this connection, the 10,000 recruits by the regular forces in March -- higher than the goals and two-thirds of them volunteers -- give encouragement. The loss ratios in the first week in

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Frustrated because they cannot achieve their ends by open and fair competition, or even by open warfare -- unable to see their way to success in the market place of ideas or even by way of the open battlefield -- ~~Communists~~ they have gone underground; they have chosen the route of stealth, deceit,

sabotage and assassination. They call this route "wars of national liberation."

By casting an ominous military shadow from outside a small nation's borders, by injection of soldiers in disguise, and by massive and secret help and direction to the disgruntled and irresponsible minorities within those borders, the Communists strike at what is at first the weakness, but what ultimately is the strength of nations that would be free. In a nation yet only on the first or second rung of the ladder of freedom, it takes many free men to build what one Communist can destroy. It takes many free men to watch where one Communist might strike. The Communists therefore find themselves in a position of holding the ability to harass and bedevil and bleed and intimidate by night a struggling nation to the edge of exhaustion.

They were growing accustomed to this advantage. And this of course is the way they would ^{have left} ~~leave~~ it. But surely they ^{could not have expected their} ~~would not have expected their~~ victims -- their targets -- peoples not of their "religion," to go along with such one-sided rules of conflict!

In Vietnam, as you can tell from our recent actions, we no longer accept the disadvantage which the Communists would impose on us. Together with the South Vietnamese, we will strive, despite harassment, to achieve a peaceful countryside and to build a better future for the population. But at the same time, we will respond outside the borders of South Vietnam as appropriate to stop the external aggression.

C. Peaceful Settlement

Is it too much to ask North Vietnam to stop its infiltration of men and materiel; to stop its clandestine direction and encouragement of the insurgency in the South; to order a stop to the Viet Cong campaign of

terror and sabotage in the South; and to remove its controlled units and cadres from the South? It is to help achieve these ends that the air strikes are now being carried out against the North; it is to help achieve these ends that US forces -- military support and combat -- are in South Vietnam. Is there not some way in which the Government of South Vietnam -- absent these intrusions from the North and without the need for massive military assistance from the outside -- can be allowed to find its own way peacefully toward its own consensus and fulfillment?

The people of the United States and of the other nations of the Free World have a dream which is finer than that of the Communists. It is a dream of independence, of fast but orderly change, of as much individual freedom as possible as soon as possible. This is the real goal of all men. We in the Free World are not convinced -- and we do not expect to be convinced -- that it is necessary for the developing nations of the world, in reaching this goal of freedom, to go through an oppressive intermediate stage of Communism.

We want a peaceful solution to the problem in South Vietnam. We want it very much. We seek no territory there. Nor do we wish to destroy North Vietnam or even, little as we like it, its regime. We want only an independent South Vietnam -- as President Johnson said, "securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others, free from outside interference, tied to no alliance, a military base for no other country. ... We remain ready, with these purposes, for unconditional discussions" with the governments concerned.

A whole range of US national interests involved in the independence of South Vietnam can be suggested by the various Communist interests in overthrowing it. To begin with, the rulers of the Communist state of North Vietnam wish to extend their rule to the 14 million people of South Vietnam; and eventually to the 5 million people of Laos and Cambodia. The rulers of Communist China wish to see Thailand outflanked, subjected to the same pressures of subversion, terrorism, infiltration and guerrilla war, and added in turn to the Communist Bloc. They wish the same fate for the neighboring nations of Southeast and South Asia. And they wish, in the interests of increasing their prestige, influence and control in the Communist Bloc and throughout the underdeveloped or vulnerable areas of the world, to demonstrate the invincibility of their tactics of subversive war; to undermine faith in the word, and the resolution, and the power of the United States as a guarantor; to show up the caution of the Soviet Union as craven; to demoralize potential victims and to win the active support of the opportunists. It is a vital national interest of the United States to frustrate each one of these objectives.

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Frustrated because they cannot achieve their ends by open and fair competition, or even by open warfare -- unable to see their way to success in the market place of ideas or even by way of the open battlefield -- ~~they~~ ^{Communists} have gone underground; they have chosen the route of stealth, deceit,

sabotage and assassination. They call this route "wars of national liberation."

By casting an ominous military shadow from outside a small nation's borders, by injection of soldiers in disguise, and by massive and secret help and direction to the disgruntled and irresponsible minorities within those borders, the Communists strike at what is at first the weakness, but what ultimately is the strength of nations that would be free. In a nation yet only on the first or second rung of the ladder of freedom, it takes many free men to build what one Communist can destroy. It takes many free men to watch where one Communist might strike. The Communists therefore find themselves in a position of holding the ability to harass and bedevil and bleed and intimidate by night a struggling nation to the edge of exhaustion.

There were growing accustomed to this advantage. And this of course is the way they would ^{have left} ~~it~~ ^{could not have expected their} ~~surely they~~ ~~could not have expected their~~ victims -- their targets -- people not of their "religion," to go along with such one-sided rules of conflict!

In Vietnam, as you can tell from our recent actions, we no longer accept the disadvantage which the Communists would impose on us. Together with the South Vietnamese, we will strive, despite harassment, to achieve a peaceful countryside and to build a better future for the population. But at the same time, we will respond outside the borders of South Vietnam as appropriate to stop the external aggression.

C. Peaceful Settlement

Is it too much to ask North Vietnam to stop its infiltration of men and materiel; to stop its clandestine direction and encouragement of the insurgency in the South; to order a stop to the Viet Cong campaign of

terror and sabotage in the South; and to remove its controlled units and cadres from the South? It is to help achieve these ends that the air strikes are now being carried out against the North; it is to help achieve these ends that US forces -- military support and combat -- are in South Vietnam. Is there not some way in which the Government of South Vietnam -- absent these intrusions from the North and without the need for massive military assistance from the outside -- can be allowed to find its own way peacefully toward its own consensus and fulfillment?

The people of the United States and of the other nations of the Free World have a dream which is finer than that of the Communists. It is a dream of independence, of fast but orderly change, of as much individual freedom as possible as soon as possible. This is the real goal of all men. We in the Free World are not convinced -- and we do not expect to be convinced -- that it is necessary for the developing nations of the world, in reaching this goal of freedom, to go through an oppressive intermediate stage of Communism.

We want a peaceful solution to the problem in South Vietnam. We want it very much. We seek no territory there. Nor do we wish to destroy North Vietnam or even, little as we like it, its regime. We want only an independent South Vietnam -- as President Johnson said, "securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others, free from outside interference, tied to no alliance, a military base for no other country. ... We remain ready, with these purposes, for unconditional discussions" with the governments concerned.